The revolving door between public and banking sectors dynamics, impacts, and regulation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46299/j.isjmef.20250405.09Keywords:
revolving door, regulatory capture, public ethics, conflict of interest, banking regulationAbstract
The phenomenon of the "revolving door", i.e. the frequent transition of individuals between high-level positions in the public sector (in particular regulators, policymakers and former Politically Exposed Persons - PEPs) and management or advisory roles in the banking and financial sector (and vice versa), is an issue of growing concern for the transparency, integrity and stability of modern economic systems. This study aims to analyze in depth the dynamics underlying this phenomenon, exploring its implications on the risk of regulatory capture, potential conflicts of interest and public trust in institutions. Through a comparative analysis and the examination of recent and relevant case studies in Italy and Europe, institutional reactions and regulatory developments aimed at mitigating their effects will be evaluated, identifying persistent gaps and proposing areas for future reforms. It will also investigate how the public perception of this phenomenon influences the legitimacy of political and financial decisions, especially in a context of growing distrust towards elites.References
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